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Abstract
This paper investigates the geometrical properties of real world games (e.g. Tic-Tac-
Toe, Go, StarCraft II). We hypothesise that their geometrical structure resembles a
spinning top, with the upright axis representing transitive strength, and the radial
axis representing the non-transitive dimension, which corresponds to the number
of cycles that exist at a particular transitive strength. We prove the existence of
this geometry for a wide class of real world games by exposing their temporal
nature. Additionally, we show that this unique structure also has consequences for
learning – it clarifies why populations of strategies are necessary for training of
agents, and how population size relates to the structure of the game. Finally, we
empirically validate these claims by using a selection of nine real world two-player
zero-sum symmetric games, showing 1) the spinning top structure is revealed and
can be easily reconstructed by using a new method of Nash clustering to measure
the interaction between transitive and cyclical strategy behaviour, and 2) the effect
that population size has on the convergence of learning in these games.
1 Introduction
Game theory has been used as a formal framework to describe and analyse many naturally emerging
strategic interactions [30, 10, 9, 28, 20, 11, 6]. It is general enough to describe very complex
interactions between agents, including classic real world games like Tic-Tac-Toe, Chess, Go, and
modern computer-based games like Quake, DOTA and StarCraft II. Simultaneously, game theory
formalisms apply to abstract games that are not necessarily interesting for humans to play, but were
created for different purposes. In this paper we ask the following question: Is there a common
structure underlying the games that humans find interesting and engaging?
Why is it important to understand the geometry of real world games? Games have been used
as benchmarks for the development of artificial intelligence for decades, starting with Shannon’s
interest in Chess [27], through to the first reinforcement learning success in Backgammon [31], IBM
DeepBlue [5] developed for Chess, and the more recent achievements of AlphaGo [29] mastering
the game of Go, FTW [13] for Quake III: Capture the Flag, AlphaStar [34] for StarCraft II, OpenAI
Five [23] for DOTA 2, and Pluribus [3] for no-limit Texas Hold ’Em Poker. We argue that grasping any
common structures to these real world games is essential to understand why specific solution methods
work, and can additionally provide us with tools to develop AI based on a deeper understanding of the
scope and limits of solutions to previously tackled problems. The analysis of non-transitive behaviour
has been critical for algorithm development in general game theoretic settings in the past [15, 1, 2].
Therefore a good tool to have would be the formalisation of non-transitive behaviour in real world
games and a method of dealing with notion of transitive progress built on top of it.
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We propose the Game of Skill hypothesis (Fig. 1) where strategies exhibit a geometry that resembles a
spinning top, where the upright axis represents the transitive strength and the radial axis corresponds
to cyclic, non-transitive dynamics. We focus on two aspects. Firstly, we theoretically and empirically
validate whether the Games of Skill geometry materialises in real world games. Secondly, we unpack
some of the key practical consequences of the hypothesis, in particular investigating the implications
for training agents.
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Figure 1: High-level visualisation of the geometry of Games of Skill. It shows a strong transitive
dimension, that is accompanied by the highly cyclic dimensions, which gradually diminishes as skill
grows towards the Nash Equilibrium (upward), and diminishes as skill evolves towards the worst
possible strategies (downward). The simplest example of non-transitive behaviour is a cycle of length
3 that one finds e.g. in the Rock Paper Scissors game.
Some of the above listed works use multi-agent training techniques that are not guaranteed to
improve/converge in all games. In fact, there are conceptually simple, yet surprisingly difficult
cyclic games that cannot be solved by these techniques [2]. This suggests that a class of real world
games might form a strict subset of 2-player symmetric zero-sum games, which are often used
as a formalism to analyse such games. The Game of Skill hypothesis provides such a class, and
makes specific predictions about how strategies behave. One clear prediction is the existence of
tremendously long cycles, which permeate throughout the space of relatively weak strategies in each
such game. Theorem 1 proves the existence of long cycles in a rich class of real world games that
includes all the examples above. Additionally, we perform an empirical analysis of nine real world
games, and establish that the hypothesised Games of Skill geometry is indeed observed in each of
them.
Finally, we analyse the implications of the Game of Skill hypothesis for learning. In many of the
works tackling real world games [13, 34, 23] some form of population-based training [12, 15] is
used, where a collection of agents is gathered and trained against. We establish theorems connecting
population size and diversity with transitive improvement guarantees, underlining the importance of
population-based training techniques used in many of the games-related research above, as well as
the notion of diversity seeking behaviours. We also confirm these with simple learning experiments
over empirical games coming from nine real world games.
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In summary, our contributions are three-fold: i) we define a game class that models real world games,
including those studied in recent AI breakthroughs (e.g. Go, StarCraft II, DOTA 2); ii) we show both
theoretically and empirically that a spinning top geometry can be observed; iii) we provide theoretical
arguments that elucidate why specific state-of-the-art algorithms lead to consistent improvements
in such games, with an outlook on developing new population-based training methods. Proofs
are provided in Supplementary Materials B, together with details on implementations of empirical
experiments (E, G, H), additional data (F), and algorithms used (A, C, D, I, J).
2 Game of Skill hypothesis
We argue that real world games have two critical features that make them Games of Skill. The first
feature is the notion of progress. Players that regularly practice need to have a sense that they will
improve and start beating less experienced players. This is a very natural property to keep people
engaged, as there is a notion of skill involved. From a game theory perspective, this translates to a
strong transitive component of the underlying game structure.
A game of pure Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) does not follow this principle and humans essentially
never play it in a standalone fashion as a means of measuring strategic skill (without at least knowing
the identity of their opponent and having some sense of their opponent’s previous strategies or biases).
The second feature is the availability of diverse game styles. A game is interesting if there are
many qualitatively different strategies [7, 17, 37] with their own strengths and weaknesses, whilst on
average performing on a similar level in the population. Examples include the various openings in
Chess and Go, which work well against other specific openings, despite not providing a universal
advantage against all opponents. It follows that players with approximately the same transitive skill
level, can still have imbalanced win rates against specific individuals within the group, as their game
styles will counter one another. This creates interesting dynamics, providing players, especially at
lower levels of skill, direct information on where they can improve. Crucially, this richness gradually
disappears as players get stronger, so at the highest level of play, the outcome relies mostly on skill
and less on game style. From a game theory perspective, this translates to non-transitive components
that rapidly decrease in magnitude relative to the transitive component as skill improves.
These two features combined would lead to a cone-like shape of the game geometry, with a wide,
highly cyclic base, and a narrow top of highly skilled strategies. However, while players usually play
the game to win, the strategy space includes many strategies whose goal is to lose. While there is
often an asymmetry between seeking wins and losses (it is often easier to lose than it is to win), the
overall geometry will be analogous - with very few strategies that lose against every other strategy,
thus creating a peaky shape at the bottom of our hypothesised geometry. This leads to a spinning top
(Figure 1) – a geometry, where, as we travel across the transitive dimension, the non-transitivity first
rapidly increases, and then, after reaching a potentially very large quantity (more formally detailed
later), quickly reduces as we approach the strongest strategies. We refer to games that exhibit such
underlying geometry as Games of Skill.
3 Preliminaries
We first establish preliminaries related to game theory and assumptions made herein. We refer to
the options, or actions, available to any player of the game as a strategy, in the game-theoretic
sense. Moreover, we focus on finite normal-form games (i.e. wherein the outcomes of a game are
represented as a payoff tensor), unless otherwise stated.
We use Π to denote the set of all strategies in a given game, with pii ∈ Π denoting a single pure
strategy. We further focus on symmetric, deterministic, zero sum games, where the payoff (outcome of
a game) is denoted by f(pii, pij) = −f(pij , pii) ∈ [−1, 1]. We say that pii beats pij when f(pii, pij) > 0,
draws when f(pii, pij) = 0 and loses otherwise. For games which are not fully symmetric (e.g. all
turn based games) we symmetrise them by considering a game we play once as player 1 and once
as player 2. Many games we mention have an underlying time-dependent structure (e.g. chess);
thus, it might be more natural to think about them in the so-called extensive-form, wherein player
decision-points are expressed in a temporal manner. To simplify our analysis, we conduct our analysis
by casting all such games to the normal-form, though we still exploit some of the time-dependent
characteristics. Consequently, when we refer to a specific game (e.g. Tic-Tac-Toe), we also analyse
3
- 1 - 1 - 1+1+1 +1
- 1
+1 +1
- 1
0
+1 0
0
0
- 1
0 +1
0
- 1
... ... ...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...............
...
...
...
...
Symmet rised Normal 
Form Game Payoff
Normal Form
Game Payoff
Extensive Form Game /
Game Tree
St rategy
Outcome
f(     ,     ) = +1
Act ion State
+1 - 1
Outcome
 f(     ,     )      =
[f(     ,     ) -
 f(     ,     )]/ 2 = +1 
+1
0
0
- 1
+1
- 1
Figure 2: Left – extensive form/game tree representation of a simple 3-step game, where in each
state a player can choose one of two actions, and after exactly 3 moves one of the players wins.
Player 1 takes actions in circle nodes, and player 2 in diamond nodes. Outcomes are presented from
the perspective of player 1. Middle – a partial normal form representation of this game, presenting
outcomes for 4 strategies, colour coded on the graph representation. Right – a symmetrised version,
where two colours denote which strategy one follows as player 1 and which as player 2.
the rules of the game itself, which might provide additional properties and insights into the geometry
of the payoffs f . In such situations, we explicitly mention that the property/insight comes from game
rules rather than its payoff structure f . This is somewhat different from a typical game theoretical
analysis (for normal form games) that might equate game and f . We use a standard tree representation
of temporally extended games, where a node represents a state of the game (e.g. the board at any
given time in the game of Tic-Tac-Toe), and edges represent what is the next game state when the
player takes a specific action (e.g. spaces where a player can mark their × or ◦). The node is called
terminal, when it is an end of the game and it provides an outcome f . In this view a strategy is a
deterministic mapping from states to actions, and an outcome between two strategies is simply the
outcome of the terminal state they reach when they play against each other. Figure 2 visualises these
views on an exemplary three step game.
We call a game monotonic when f(pii, pij) > 0 and f(pij , pik) > 0 implies f(pii, pik) > 0. In other
words, the relation of one strategy beating another is transitive in the set theory sense. We say that a
set of strategies {pii}li=1 forms a cycle of length l when for each i > 1 we have f(pii+1, pii) > 0 and
f(pi1, pil) > 0. For example, in the game of Rock Paper Scissors we have f(pir, pis) = f(pis, pip) =
f(pip, pir) = 1. There are various ways in which one could define a decomposition of a given game
into the transitive and non-transitive components [2]. In this paper, we introduce Nash clustering,
where the transitive component becomes an index of it, and non-transitivity corresponds to the size of
this cluster. We do not claim that this is the only nor the best way of thinking about this phenomena,
but we found it to have valuable mathematical properties.
The manner in which we study the geometry of games in this paper is motivated by the structural
properties that AI practitioners have exploited to build competent agents for real world games [34, 29,
23], using reinforcement learning (RL). Specifically, consider an empirical game-theoretic outlook
on training of policies in a game (e.g. Tic-Tac-Toe), where each trained policy (e.g. neural network)
for a player is considered as a strategy of the empirical game. In other words, an empirical game is a
normal-form game wherein AI policies are synonymous with strategies. Each of these policies, when
deployed on the true underlying game, yields an outcome (e.g. win/loss) captured by the payoff in the
empirical game. Thus, in each step of training, the underlying RL algorithm produces an approximate
best response in the actual underlying (multistep, extensive form) game; this approximate best
response is then added to the set of policies (strategies) in the empirical game, iteratively expanding
it.
This AI training process is also often hierarchical – there is some form of multi-agent scheduling
process that selects a set of agents to be beaten at a given iteration (e.g. playing against a previous
version of an agent in self-play [29], or against some distribution of agents generated in the past [34]),
and the underlying RL algorithm used for training new policies performs optimisation to find an
agent that satisfies this constraint. There is a risk that the RL algorithm finds very weak strategies that
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satisfy the constraint (e.g. strategies that are highly exploitable). Issues like this have been observed
in various large-scale projects (e.g. exploits that human players found in the Open AI Five [23] or
exploiters in League Training of AlphaStar [34]). This exemplifies some of the challenges of creating
AI agents, which are not the same that humans face when they play a specific game. Given these
insights, we argue that algorithms can be disproportionately affected by the existence of various
non-transitive geometries, in contrast to humans.
4 Real world games are complex
The spinning top hypothesis implies that at some relatively low level of transitive strength, one should
expect very long cycles in any Game of Skill. We now prove that, in a large class of games (ranging
from board games such as Go and Chess to modern computer games such as DOTA and StarCraft),
one can find tremendously long cycles, as well as any other non-transitive geometries.
We first introduce the notion of n-bit communicative games, which provide a mechanism for lower
bounding the number of cyclic strategies. For a given game with payoff f , we define its win-draw-loss
version with the same rules and payoffs f† = sign ◦ f , which simply removes the score value, and
collapses all wins, draws, and losses onto +1, 0, and -1 respectively. Importantly, this transformation
does not affect winning, nor the notion of cycles (though could, for example, change Nash equilibria).
Definition 1. Consider the extensive form view of the win-draw-loss version of any underlying game;
the underlying game is called n-bit communicative if each player can transmit n ∈ R+ bits of
information to the other player before reaching the node whereafter at least one of the outcomes ‘win’
or ‘loss’ is not attainable.
For example, the game in Figure 2 is 1-bit communicative, as each player can take one out of two
actions before their actions would predetermine the outcome. We next show that as games become
more communicative, the set of strategies that form non-transitive interactions grows exponentially.
Theorem 1. For every game that is at least n-bit communicative, and every antisymmetric win-loss
payoff matrixP ∈ {−1, 0, 1}b2nc×b2nc, there exists a set of b2nc pure strategies {pi1, ..., pib2nc} ⊂ Π
such that Pij = f†(pii, pij), and bxc = maxa∈N a ≤ x.
In particular, this means that if we pick P to be cyclic – where for each i < b2nc we have Pij = 1
for j < i, Pji = −1 and Pii = 0, and for the last strategy we do the same, apart from making it lose
to strategy 1, by putting Pb2nc1 = −1 – we obtain a constructive proof of a cycle of length b2nc,
since pi1 beats pib2nc, pib2nc beats pib2nc−1, pib2nc−1 beats pib2nc−2, ..., pi2 beats pi1. In practise, the
longest cycles can be much longer (see the example of the Parity Game of Skill in the Supplementary
Materials) and thus the above result should be treated as a lower bound.
Note, that strategies composing these long cycles will be very weak in terms of their transitive
performance, but of course not as weak as strategies that actively seek to loose, and thus in the
hypothesised geometry they would occupy the thick, middle level of the spinning top. Since such
strategies do not particularly target winning or losing, they are unlikely to be executed by a human
playing a game. Despite this, we use them to exemplify the most extreme part of the underlying
geometry, and given that in both the extremes of very strong and very weak policies we expect
non-transitivities to be much smaller than that, we hypothesise that they behave approximately
monotonically in both these directions.
We provide an efficient algorithm to compute n by traversing the game tree (linear in number of
transitions between states) in Supplementary Materials together with derivation of its recursive
formulation. We found that Tic-Tac-Toe is 5.58-bit communicative (which means that every payoff
of size 47× 47 is realised by some strategies). Additionally, all 1-step games (e.g. RPS) are 0-bit
communicative, as all actions immediately prescribe the outcome without the ability to communicate
any information. For games where state space is too large to be traversed, we can consider a heuristic
choice of a subset of actions allowed in each state thus providing a lower bound on n, e.g. in Go we
can play stones on one half of the board, and show that n ≥ 1000.
Proposition 1. The game of Go is at least 1000-bit communicative and contains a cycle of length at
least 21000.
Proposition 2. Modern games, such as StarCraft, DOTA or Quake, when limited to 10 minutes play,
are at least 36000-bit communicative.
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The above analysis shows that real world games have an extraordinarily complex structure, which is
not commonly analysed in classical game theory. The sequential, multistep aspect of these games
makes a substantial difference, as even though one could simply view each of them in a normal form
way [21], this would hide the true structure exposed via our analysis.
Naturally, the above does not prove that real world games follow the Games of Skill geometry. To
validate the merit of this hypothesis, however, we simply follow the well-established path of proving
hypothetical models in natural sciences (e.g. physics). Notably, the rich non-transitive structure
(located somewhere in the middle of the transitive dimension) exposed by this analysis is a key
property that the hypothesised Game of Skill geometry would imply. More concretely, in Section 6
we conduct empirical game theory-based analysis [33] of a wide range of real world games to show
that the hypothesised spinning top geometry can, indeed, be observed.
5 Layered game geometry
The practical consequences of huge sets of non-transitive strategies are two-fold. First, building naive
multi-agent training regimes, that try to deal with non-transitivity by asking agents to form a cycle
(e.g. by losing to some opponents), is likely to fail – there are just too many ways in which one can
lose without providing any transitive improvement for other agents trained against it. Second, there
exists a shared geometry and structure across many games, that we should exploit when designing
multi-agent training algorithms. In particular, we show how these properties justify some of the
recent training techniques involving population-level play and the League Training used in Vinyals et
al. [34]. In this section, we investigate the implications of such a game geometry on the training of
agents, starting with a simplified variant that enables building of intuitions and algorithmic insights.
Definition 2 k-layered finite Game of Skill. We say that a game is a k-layered finite Game of Skill
if the set of strategies Π can be factorised into k layers Li such that
⋃
i Li = Π, ∀i6=jLi ∩ Lj = ∅
and layers are fully transitive in the sense that ∀i<j,pii∈Li,pij∈Lj f(pii, pij) > 0 and there exists z ∈ N
such that for each i < z we have |Li| ≤ |Li+1| and |Li| ≥ |Li+1| for i ≥ z.
Intuitively, all the non-transitive interaction take place within each layer Li, whilst the skill (or
transitive) component of the game corresponds to a layer ID. For every finite game, there exists
k ≥ 1 for which it is a k-layered game (though when k = 1 this structure is not useful). Moreover,
every monotonic game has as many layers as there are strategies in the game. Even the simplest
non-transitive structure can be challenging for many training algorithms used in practise [23, 29, 13],
such as naive self-play [2]. However, a simple form of fictitious play with a hard limit on population
size will converge independently of the oracle used (the oracle being the underlying algorithm that
returns a new policy that satisfies a given improvement criterion):
Proposition 3. Fixed-memory size fictitious play initialised with population of strategies P0 ⊂
Π where at iteration t one replaces some strategy in Pt−1 with a new strategy pi such that
∀pii∈Pt−1f(pi, pii) > 0 converges in layered Games of Skill, if the population is not smaller than the
size of the lowest layer occupied by at least one strategy in the population |P0| ≥ |Largmink:P0∩Lk 6=∅|
and at least one strategy is above z. If all strategies are below z, then required size is that of |Lz|.
Intuitively, to guarantee transitive improvements over time, it is important to cover all possible game
styles. This proposition also leads to a known result of needing just one strategy in the population (e.g.
self-play) to keep improving in monotonic games [2]. Finally, it also shows an important intuition
related to how modern AI systems are built – the complexity of the non-transitivity discovery/handling
methodology decreases as the overall transitive strength of the population grows. Various agent priors
(e.g. search, architectural choices for parametric models such as neural networks, smart initialisation
such as imitation learning etc.) will initialise in higher parts of the spinning top, and also restrict
the set of representable strategies to the transitively stronger ones. This means that there exists a
form of balance between priors one builds into an AI system and the amount of required multi-agent
learning complexity required (see Figure 3 for a comparison of various recent state of the art AI
systems). From a practical perspective, there is no simple way of knowing |Lz| without traversing the
entire game tree. Consequently, this property is not directly transferable to the design of an efficient
algorithm (as if one had access to the full game tree traversal, one could simply use Min-Max to solve
the game). Instead, this analysis provides an intuitive mechanism, explaining why finite-memory
fictitious self-play can work well in practice.
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Figure 3: Visualisation of various state of the art approaches for solving real world games, with
respect to the multi-agent algorithm and agent modules used (on the left). Under the assumption that
these projects led to the approximately best agents possible, and that the Game of Skill hypothesis
is true for these games, we can predict what part of the spinning top each of them had to explore
(represented as intervals on the right). This comes from the complexity of the multi-agent algorithm
(the method of dealing with non-transitivity) that was employed – the more complex the algorithm,
the larger the region of the top that was likely represented by the strategies using the specific agent
stack. This analysis does not expose which approach is better or worse. Instead, it provides intuition
into how the development of training pipelines used in the literature enables simplification of non-
transitivity avoidance techniques, as it provides an initial set of strategies high enough in the spinning
top.
In practise, the non-transitive interactions are not ordered in a simple layer structure, where each
strategy from one beats each from the other. We can however relax notion of transitive relation which
will induce a new cluster structure. The idea behind this approach, called Nash clustering, is to first
find the mixed Nash equilibrium of the game payoff P over the set of pure strategies Π (we denote
the equilibrium for payoff P when restricted only to strategies in X by Nash(P|X)), and form a first
cluster by taking all the pure strategies in the support of this mixture. Then, we restrict our game to
the remaining strategies, repeating the process until no strategies remain.
Definition 3. Nash clustering C of the finite zero-sum symmetric game strategy Π set by setting for
each i ≥ 1: Ni+1 = supp(Nash(P|Π \
⋃
j≤iNj)) for N0 = ∅ and C = (Nj : j ∈ N ∧Nj 6= ∅).
While there might be many Nash clusterings per game, there exists a unique maximum entropy Nash
clustering where at each iteration we select a Nash equlibrium with maximum Shannon entropy,
which is guaranteed to be unique [24] due to the convexity of the objective. The crucial result
is that Nash clusters form a monotonic ordering with respect to Relative Population Performance
(RPP) [2], which is defined for two sets of agents ΠA,ΠB with a corresponding Nash equilibrium of
the asymmetric game (pA, pB) := Nash(PAB |(A,B)) as RPP(ΠA,ΠB) = pTA ·PAB · pB .
Theorem 2. Nash clustering satisfies RPP(Ci,Cj) ≥ 0 for each j > i.
We refer to this notion as a relaxation, since it is not each strategy in one cluster that is better than
in the other, but rather the whole cluster is better than the other. In particular, this means that in
k-layered game, the new clusters are subsets of layers (because Nash equilibrium will never contain
a fully dominated strategy). Next we show that a diverse population that spans an entire cluster
guarantees transitive improvement, despite not having access to any weaker policies nor knowledge
of covering the cluster.
Theorem 3. If at any point in time, the training population Pt includes any full Nash cluster
Ci ⊂ Pt, then training against Pt by finding pi such that ∀pij∈Ptf(pi, pij) > 0 guarantees transitive
improvement in terms of the Nash clustering ∃k<i pi ∈ Ck.
Consequently, to keep improving transitively, it is helpful to seek wide coverage of strategies around
the current transitive strength (inside the cluster). This high level idea has been applied in some
multi-player games such as soccer [18] and more recently StarCraft II. AlphaStar [34] explicitly
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attempts to cover the non-transitivities using exploiters, which implicitly try to expand on the current
Nash. Interestingly, same principle can be applied to single-player domains and justify seeking
diversity of the environments, so that agents need to improve transitively with respect to them. With
the Game of Skill geometry one can rely on this required coverage to be smaller over time (as agents
get stronger). Thus, forcing the new generation of agents to be the weakest ones that beat the previous
one would be sufficient to keep covering cluster after cluster, until reaching the final one.
Table 1: (Left of each plot) Game profiles of empirical game geometries, when sampling strategies in
various real world games, such as Connect Four, Tic-Tac-Toe and StarCraft II (note that strategies in
AlphaStar come from a learning system, and not our sampling strategy, see Supplementary Materials
for details and discussion). The first three rows shows clearly the Game of Skill geometry, while
the last row shows the geometry for games that are not Games of Skill, and clearly do not follow
this geometry. The pink curve shows a fitted Skewed Gaussian highlighting the spinning top shape
(details in Supplementary Materials). (Right of each plot) Learning curves in empirical games, using
various population sizes, the oldest strategy in the population is replaced with one that beats the
whole population on average using an adversarial oracle (returning the weakest strategy satisfying
this goal). For Games of Skill there is a phase change of behaviour for most games, where once the
population is big enough to deal with the non transitivity, the system converges to the strongest policy.
On the other hand, in other games (bottom) such as the Disc game, no population size avoids cycling,
and for fully transitive games like the Elo game, even naive self play converges.
6 Empirical validation of Game of Skill hypothesis
To empirically validate the spinning top geometry, we consider a selection of two-player zero-
sum games available in the OpenSpiel library [16]. Unfortunately, even for the simplest of real
world games, the strategy space can be enormous. For example, the number of behaviourally
unique pure strategies in Tic-Tac-Toe is larger than 10567 (see Supplementary Materials). A full
enumeration-based analysis is therefore computationally infeasible. Instead, we rely on empirical
game-theoretic analysis, an experimental paradigm that relies on simulation and sampling of strategies
to construct abstracted counterparts of complex underlying games, which are more amenable for
analysis [35, 36, 25, 38, 26, 32]. Specifically, we look for strategy sampling that covers the strategy
space as uniformly as possible so that the underlying geometry of the game (as exposed by the
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empirical counterpart) is minimally biased. A simple and intuitive procedure for strategy sampling
is as follows. First, apply a tree-search method, in the form of Alpha-Beta [22] and MCTS [4] and
select a range of parameters that control the transitive strength of these algorithms (depth of search
for Alpha-Beta and number of simulations for MCTS) to ensure coverage of transitive dimension.
Second, for each such strategy we create multiple instances, with varied random number seed, thus
causing them to behave differently. We additionally include Alpha-Beta agents that actively seek to
lose, to ensure discovery of the lower cone of the hypothesised spinning top geometry. While this
procedure does not guarantee uniform sampling of strategies, it at least provides decent coverage of
the transitive dimension. In total, this yields approximately 1000 agents per game. Finally, following
strategy sampling, we form an empirical payoff table with entries evaluating the payoffs of all strategy
match-ups, remove all duplicate agents, and use this matrix to approximate the underlying game of
interest.
Table 1 summarises the empirical analysis which, for the sake of completeness, includes both Games
of Skill and games that are not Games of Skill such as the Disc game [2], a purely transitive Elo
game, and the Blotto game. Overall, all real world games results show the hypothesised spinning
top geometry. More closely inspecting the example of Go (3×3) in Table 2 of the Supplementary
Materials, we notice that the Nash clusters induced payoff look monotonic, and the sizes of these
are maximal around the mid-ranges of transitive strength, and quickly decrease as transitive strength
both increases or decreases. At the level of the strongest strategies, non-trivial Nash clusters exist,
showing that even in this empirical approximation of the game of Go on a small board, one still needs
some diversity of play styles. This is to be expected due to various game symmetries of the game
rules. Moreover, various games that were created to study game theory (rather than for humans to
play) fail to exhibit the hypothesised geometry. In the game of Blotto, for example, the size of Nash
clusters keep increasing, as the number of strategies one needs to mix at higher and higher levels of
play in this game keeps growing. This is a desired property for the purpose of studying complexity of
games, but arguably not so for a game that is simply played for enjoyment. In particular, the game of
Blotto requires players to mix uniformly over all possible permutations to be unexploitable (since the
game is invariant to permutations), which is difficult for a human player to achieve.
We tested the population size claims of Nash coverage as follows. First, construct empirical games
coming from the sampling of n agents defined above, yielding an approximation of the underlying
games. Second, define a simple learning algorithm, where we start with k (size of the population)
weakest strategies (wrt. mean win-rate) and iteratively replace the oldest one with a strategy pi that
beats the entire population Pt on average, meaning that ∑pi′∈Pt f(pi, pi′) > 0. To pick the new
strategy, we use a pessimistic oracle that selects the weakest strategy satisfying the win-rate condition.
This counters the bias towards sampling stronger strategies, thus yielding a more fair approximation
of typical greedy learning methods such as gradient-based methods or reinforcement learning.
For small population sizes, training does not converge and cycles for all games (Table 1). As the
population grows, strength increases but saturates in various suboptimal cycles. However, when the
population exceeds a critical size, training converges to the best strategies in almost all experiments.
For games that are not real world games we observe quite different behaviour - where, despite growth
of population size, cycling keeps occuring (e.g. the Disc game), convergence is guaranteed even with
a population of size 1 (e.g. the Elo game, which is monotonic).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced Games of Skill, a class of games that, as motivated both theoretically
and empirically, includes many real world games, including Tic-Tac-Toe, Chess, Go and even
StarCraft II and DOTA. In particular we showed, that n-step games have tremendously long cycles,
and provided both mathematical and algorithmic methods to estimate this quantity. We showed, that
Games of Skill have a geometry resembling a spinning top, which can be used to reason about their
learning dynamics. In particular, our insights provide useful guidance for research into population-
based learning techniques building on League training [34] and PBT [13], especially when enriched
with notions of diversity seeking [2]. Interestingly, we show that many games from classical game
theory are not Games of Skill, and as such might provide challenges that are not necessarily relevant
to developing AI methods for real world games. We hope that this work will encourage researchers
to study real world games structures, to build better AI techniques that can exploit their unique
geometries.
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Theorem 1. For every game that is at least n-bit communicative, and every antisymmetric win-loss
payoff matrixP ∈ {−1, 0, 1}b2nc×b2nc, there exists a set of b2nc pure strategies {pi1, ..., pib2nc} ⊂ Π
such that Pij = f†(pii, pij), and bxc = maxa∈N a ≤ x.
Proof. Let us assume we are given some Pij . We define corresponding strategies pii such that each
starts by transmitting its ID as a binary vector using n bits. Afterwards, strategy pii reads out Pij
based on its own id, as well as the decoded ID of an opponent pij , and since we assumed each
win-draw-loss outcome can still be reached in a game tree, players then play to win/draw or lose,
depending on the value of Pij . We choose pii and pij to follow the first strategy in lexicographic
ordering (to deal with partially observable/concurrent move games) over sequences of actions that
leads to Pij to guarantee the outcome. Ordering over actions is arbitrary and fixed. Since identities
are transmitted using binary codes, there are b2nc possible ones.
Proposition 1. The game of Go is at least 1000-bit communicative and contains a cycle of length at
least 21000.
Proof. Since Go has a resign action, one can use the entire state space for information encoding,
whilst still being able to reach both winning and losing outcomes. The game is played on a 19×19
board – if we split it in half we get 180 places to put stones per side, such that the middle point is
still empty, and thus any placement of players stones on their half is legal and no stones die. These
180 fields give each player the ability to transfer
∑1
i=180 log2(i) = log2(180!) ≈ 1000 bits. and
according to Theorem 1 we thus have a cycle of length 21000 > 10100. Figure 6 provides visualisation
of this construction.
Proposition 2. Modern games, such as StarCraft, DOTA or Quake, when limited to 10 minutes play,
are at least 36000-bit communicative.
Proof. With modern games running at 60Hz, as long as agents can “meet” in some place, and execute
60 actions per second that does not change their visibility (such as tiny rotations), they can transmit
60 · 60 · 10 = 36000 bits of information per 10 minute encounter. Note, that this is very loose lower
bound, as we are only transmitting one bit of information per action, while this could be significantly
enriched, if we allow for use of multiple actions (such as jumping, moving multiple units etc.).
Proposition 3. Fixed-memory size fictitious play initialised with population of strategies P0 ⊂
Π where at iteration t one replaces some strategy in Pt−1 with a new strategy pi such that
∀pii∈Pt−1f(pi, pii) > 0 converges in layered Games of Skill, if the population is not smaller than the
size of the lowest layer occupied by at least one strategy in the population |P0| ≥ |Largmink:P0∩Lk 6=∅|
and at least one strategy is above z. If all strategies are below z, then required size is that of |Lz|.
Proof. Let’s assume at least one strategy is above z. We will prove, that there will be at most |Pt| − 1
consecutive iterations where algorithm will not improve transitively (defined as a new strategy being
part of Li where i is smaller than the lowest number of all Lj that have non empty intersections with
Pt). Since we require the new strategy pit+1 added at time t+ 1 to beat all previous strategies, it has
to occupy at least a level, that is occupied by the strongest strategy in Pt. Let’s denote this level by Lk,
then pit+1 improves transitively, meaning that there exists i < k such that pit+1 ∈ Li, or it belongs to
Lk itself. Since by construction |Lk| ≤ |Pt|, this can happen at most |Pt| − 1 times, as each strategy
in Pt ∩ Lk needs to be beaten by pit+1 and |Pt ∩ Lk| < |Pt|. By the analogous argument, if all the
strategies are below Lz , one can have at most |maxi |Li| − 1 consecutive iterations without transitive
improvement.
Theorem 2. Nash clustering satisfies RPP(Ci,Cj) ≥ 0 for each j > i.
Proof. By definition for each A and each B′ ⊂ B we have RPP(A,B′) ≥ RPP(A,B), thus for
Xi := Π \
⋃
k<i Ck and every j > i we have Cj ⊂ Xi and
RPP(Ci,Cj) ≥ RPP(Ci, Xi)
= RPP(supp(Nash(P|Xi)), Xi)
= RPP(Xi, Xi) = 0.
(1)
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Theorem 3. If at any point in time, the training population Pt includes any full Nash cluster
Ci ⊂ Pt, then training against Pt by finding pi such that ∀pij∈Ptf(pi, pij) > 0 guarantees transitive
improvement in terms of the Nash clustering ∃k<i pi ∈ Ck.
Proof. Lets assume that ∃k>ipi ∈ Ck. This means, that
RPP(Ci,Ck) ≤ max
pij∈Ci
f(pij , pi) = max
pij∈Ci
[−f(pi, pij)] < 0, (2)
where the last inequality comes from the fact that Ci ⊂ Pt and ∀pij∈Ptf(pi, pij) > 0 implies that
∀pij∈Cif(pi, pij) > 0. This leads to a contradiction with the Nash clustering and thus pi ∈ Ck for
some k ≤ i. Finally pi cannot belong to Ci itself since ∀pij∈Cif(pi, pij) > 0 = f(pi, pi).
B Computing n in n-bit communicative games
Our goal is to be able to encode identity of a pure strategy in actions it is taking, in such a way,
that opponent will be able to decode it. We focus on fully observable, turn-based games. Note, that
with pure policy, and fully observable game, the only way to sent information to the other player
is by taking an action (which is observed). Consequently, if at given state one considers A actions,
then choosing one of them we can transmit log2(A) bits. We will build our argument recursively, by
considering subtrees of a game tree. Naturally, a subtree is a tree of some game. Since the assumption
of n-bit communicativeness is that we can transmit n bits of information before outcomes become
independent, it is easy to note that a subtree for which we cannot find terminal nodes with both
outcomes (-1, +1) is 0-bit communicative. Let’s remove these nodes from the tree. In the new tree,
all the leaf nodes are still 0-bit communicative, as now they are “one action away” from making the
outcome deterministic. Let’s define function φ per state, that will output how many bits each player
can transmit, before the game becomes deterministic, so for each player j
φj(s) = 0 if s is a leaf.
The crucial element is how to now deal with a decision node. Let’s use notation c(s) to denote set
of all children states, which we assume correspond to taking actions available in this state. If many
actions would lead to the same state, we just pretend only one such action exists. From the perspective
of player j, what we can do, is to select a subset of states that are reachable from s. If we do so, we
will be able to encode log2 |c(s)| bits in this move plus whatever we can encode in the future, which
is simply mins′∈c(s) φj(s′) as we need to guarantee being able to transmit this number of bits no
matter which path is taken.
φj(s) = max
I⊂c(s)
{log2 |c(s)|+ min
s′∈c(s)
φj(s
′)}
However, our argument is symmetric, meaning that we need to not only transmit bits as player j, but
also our opponent, and to do so we need to consider minimum over players respective communication
channels:
φj(s) = max
I⊂c(s)
{log2 |c(s)|+ min
s′∈c(s)
min
i
φi(s
′)}
It is easy to notice that for a starting state s0 we now have that the game is mini φi(s0)-bit commu-
nicative. The last recursive equation might look intractable, due to iteration over subsets of children
states. However, we can easily compute quantities like this in linear time. Let’s take general form of
max
A⊂B
{g0(|A|) + min
a∈A
g1(a)} =: max
A⊂B
g(A) (3)
and let’s consider Alg. 1. To prove that it outputs maximum of g, let’s assume that at any point
t we decided to pick b′ 6= bt. Since bt has highest g at this point, we have g1(b′) < g1(bt), and
consequently g(Ct−1 ∪ {b′}) < g(Ct−1 ∪ {bt}) so we decreased function value and conclude
optimality proof.
We provide a pseudocode in Alg. 2 for the two-player, turn-based case with deterministic transitions.
Analogous construction will work for k players, simultaneous move games, as well as games with
chance nodes (one just needs to define what we want to happen there, taking minimum will guarantee
transmission of bits, and taking expectation will compute expected number of bits instead).
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Table 2: Game profiles of empirical game geometries, when sampling strategies in various real world
games, such as Connect Four, Tic Tac Toe and even StarCraft II. The first three rows shows clearly
the Game of Skill geometry, while the last row shows the geometry for games that are not Games of
Skill, and clearly do not follow this geometry. Rows of the payoffs are sorted by mean winrate for
easier visual inspection. The pink curve shows a fitted Skewed Gaussian to show the spinning top
shape, details provided in Supplementary Materials.
Exemplary execution at some state of Tic-Tac-Toe is provided in Figure 5. Figure 6 shows the
construction from Proposition 1 for the game of Go.
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Algorithm 1 Solver for Eq. 3 in O(|B|).
Input: functions f , g and set B:
begin
C ← ∅
g(X)← g0(|X|) + minx∈X g1(x) {Eq. 3}
sort B in descending order of g1
for b ∈ B do
if g(C ∪ {b}) > g(C) then
C ← C ∪ {b}
end if
end for
return C
We can use exactly the same procedure to compute n-communicativeness over restricted set of
policies. For example let us consider strategies using MinMax algorithm to a fixed depth, between 0
and 9. Furthermore, we restrict what kind of first move they can make (e.g. only in the centre, or in a
way that is rotationally invariant). Each such class simply defines a new “leaf” labelling of our tree or
set of available children. Once we reach a state, after which considered policy is deterministic, by
definition its communicativeness is zero, so we put φ(s) = 0 there. Then we again run the recursive
procedure. Running this analysis on the game of Tic-Tac-Toe (Fig. 4) reveals the Spinning Top like
geometry wrt. class of policies used. As MinMax depth grows, cycle length bound from Theorem 1
decreases rapidly. Similarly introducing more inductive bias in the form of selecting what are good
first moves affect the shape in an analogous way. This example has two important properties. First, it
Figure 4: Visualisation of cycle bound lengths coming from Theorem 1, when applied to the game
of Tic-Tac-Toe over restricted set of policies – y axis corresponds to the depth of MinMax search
(encoding transitive strength); and colour and line style correspond to restricted first move (encoding
better and better inductive prior over how to play this game).
shows cyclic dimensions behaviour over whole policy space, as we do not rely on any sampling, but
rather consider the whole space, restricting the transitive strength and using Theorem 1 as a proxy
of non-transitivity. Second, it acts as an exemplification of the claim of various inductive biases
restricting the part of the spinning top one needs to deal with when developing and AI for the specific
game.
C Cycles counting
In general even the problem of deciding if a graph has a simple path of length higher than some (large)
k is NP-hard. Consequently we focus our attention only on cycles of length 3 (which embed Rock-
Paper-Scissor dynamics). For this problem, we can take adjacency matrix Aij = 1 ⇐⇒ Pij > 0
and simply compute diag(A3), which will give us number of length 3 cycles that pass through each
node. Note, that this technique no longer works for longer cycles as diag(Ap) computes number of
closed walks instead of closed paths (in other words – nodes could be repeated). For p = 3 these
concepts coincide though.
16
Algorithm 2 Main algorithm to compute n for which a given fully observable two-player zero-sum
game is n-bit communicative.
Input: Game tree encoded with:
- states: si ∈ S
- value of a state: v(si) ∈ {−1, 0,+1, ∅}
- set of children states c(si) ⊂ S
- set of parent states d(si) ⊂ S
- which player moves p(si) ∈ {0, 1}
begin {Remove states with deterministic outcomes}
si ← {si : ∀o∈{−1,+1}∃path(si,sj) ∧ v(sj) = o}
update c
q = [si : c(si) = ∅] {Init with leaves}
while |q| > 0 do
x← q.pop()
φ(x) = Agg(x) {Alg. 3}
for y ∈ d(x) do
if ∀z ∈ c(p) defined(φ(z)) then
q.enqueue(y) {Enqueue a parent if all its children were analysed}
end if
end for
end while
return minφ(s0)
Algorithm 3 Aggregate (Agg) - helper function for Alg. 2
Input: State x
begin
m← [minφ(z) for z ∈ c(x)] {min over players}
o← [φ(z)[1− p(x)] for z ∈ c(x)] {other player bits}
sort m in decreasing order {Order by decreasing communicativeness}
order o in the same order
b← (0, 0)
for i = 1 to |c(x)| do
t[p(x)]← min(m[: i]) + log2(i)
t[1− p(x)]← min(o[: i])
if t[p(x)] > b[p(x)] then
b = t {Update maximum}
end if
end for
return b
D Nash computation
We use iterative maximum entropy Nash solver for both Nash clustering and RPP [2] computation.
Since we use numerical solvers, the mixtures found are not exactly Nash equilibria. To ensure that
they are “good enough” we find a best response, and check if the outcome is bigger than -1e-4. If
it fails, we continue iterating until it is satisfied. For the data considered, this procedure always
terminated. While usage of maximum entropy Nash might lead to unnecessarily “heavy” tops of
the spinning top geometry (since equivalently we could pick smallest entropy ones, which would
form more peaky tops) it guaranteed determinism of all the procedures (as maximum entropy Nash is
unique).
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E Games/payoffs definition
After construction of each empirical payoff P, we first symmetrise it (so that ordering of players does
not matter), and then standarise it P′ij :=
Pij−Pji
2max |P| for the analysis and plotting to keep all the scales
easy to compare. This has no effect on Nashes or transitive strength, and is only used for consistent
presentation of the results, asP′ ∈ [−1, 1]N×N . For most of the games this was an identity operation
(as for most P we had maxP = −minP = 1), and was mostly useful for various random games
and Blotto, which have wider range of outcomes.
E.1 Real world games
We use OpenSpiel [16] implementations of all the games analysed in this paper, with following
setups:
• Hex 3X3: hex(board_size=3)
• Go 3X3: go(board_size=3,komi=6.5)
• Go 4X4: go(board_size=4,komi=6.5)
• Quoridor 3X3: quoridor(board_size=3)
• Quoridor 4X4: quoridor(board_size=4)
• Tic Tac Toe: tic_tac_toe()
• Misere Tic Tac Toe (a game of Tic Tac Toe where one wins if and onlfy if opponent makes a
line): misere(game=tic_tac_toe())
• Connect Four: connect_four()
E.2 StarCraft II (AlphaStar)
We use payoff matrix of the League of the AlphaStar Final [34] which represent a big population
(900 agents) playing at a wide range of skills, using all 3 races of the game, and playing it without
any simplifications. We did not run any of the StarCraft experiments. Sampling of these strategies is
least controlled, and comes from a unique way in which AlphaStar system was trained.
This heavily skewed strategies sampling means that what we are observing is a study of AlphaStar
induced game geometry, rather then necesarily geometry of the StarCraft II itself. In particular, one
can ask why do we see a spinning top shape, rather than an upper cone, that we might expect given
that AlphaStar agents never try to lose. The answer lies in how these strategies were created [34]
namely – they come from iterative process, where agents are trained to beat all the previous strategies.
In such setup, despite lack of an agent actively seeking to lose, the initial strategies will act as if they
were designed to do so, since every other strategy was trained to beat them, while they were never
trained to defend. The non-transitivies start to emerge, once “League exploiters” and “Exploiters”
are slowly added to the population, and thus building strategic diversity. While these two factors
and dynamics are different from the ones that motivate the geometry in remaining experiments,
it surprisingly shared the self-similarity. From the perspective of the entire game of StarCraft II
however, the shape we are observing is slightly warped, and we would expect to see an upper cone, if
we were given ability to sample weak strategies more uniformly, without every other strategy being
sampled conditionally on beating them.
E.3 Rock Paper Scissor (RPS)
We use standard Rock-Paper-Scissor payoff of form
P =
[
0 1 −1
−1 0 1
1 −1 0
]
.
This game is fully cyclic, and there is no pure strategy Nash (the only Nash-equilibrium is the uniform
mixture of strategies).
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Maybe surprisingly, people do play RPS competitively, however it is important to note, that in
“real-life” the game of RPS is much richer, than its game theoretic counterpart. First, it often involves
repeated trials, which means one starts to reason about the strategy opponent is employing, and try to
exploit it while not being exploited themselves. Second, identity of the opponent is often known, and
since player are humans, they have inherit biases in the form of not being able to play completely
randomly, having beliefs, preferences and other properties, that can be analysed (based on historical
matches) and exploited. Finally, since the game is often played in a physical environment, there
might be various subconscious tells for a given player, that inform the opponent about which move
they are going to play, akin to Clever Hans phenomena.
E.4 Disc Game
We use definition of random game from the “Open-ended learning in symmetric zero-sum games”
paper [2]. We first sample N = 1000 points uniformly in the unit circle Ai ∼ U(S(0, 1)) and then
put
Pij = A
T
i
[
0 −1
1 0
]
Aj .
Similarly to RPS, this game is fully cyclic.
E.5 Elo game
We sample Elo rating [8] per player Si ∼ U(0, 2000), and then put Pij := (1 + e−(Si−Sj)/400)−1,
which is equivalent of using scaled difference in strength Dij = (Si − Sj)/400 squashed through a
sigmoid function σ(x) = (1 + e−x)−1. It is easy to see that this game is monotonic, meaning that
Pij > Pjk → Pik. We use N = 1000 samples.
E.6 Noisy Elo games
For a given noise  > 0 we first build an Elo game, and then take N2 independent samples from
N (0, ) and add it to corresponding entries of P, creating P. After that, we symmetrise the payoff
by putting P := P −PT .
E.7 Random Game of Skill
We put Pij := 12 (Wij −Wji) + Si − Sj where each of the random variables Wij , Si comes fromN (0, 1). We use N = 1000 samples.
E.8 Blotto
Blotto is a two-player symmetric zero-sum game, where each player selects a way to place N units
onto K fields. The outcome of the game is simply number of fields, where a player has more units
than the opponent minus the symmetric quantitiy. We choose N=10, K=5, which creates around 1000
pure strategies, but analogous results were obtained for various other setups we tested. One could
ask why is Blotto getting more non-transitive as our strength increases. One simple answer is that
the game is permutation invariant, and thus forces optimal strategy to be played uniformly over all
possible permutations, which makes the Nash support grow. Real world games, on the other hand,
are almost always ordered, sequential, in nature.
E.9 Kuhn Poker
Kuhn Poker [14] is a two-player, sequential-move, asymmetric game with 12 information states (6
per player). Each player starts the game with 2 chips, antes a single chip to play, then receives a
face-down card from a deck of 3 cards. At each information state, each player has the choice of two
actions, betting or passing. We use the implementation of this game in the OpenSpiel library [16]. To
construct the empirical payoff matrices, we enumerate all possible policies of each player, noting that
some of the enumerated policies of player 1 may yield identical outcomes depending on the policy of
player 2, as certain information states may not be reachable by player 1 in such situations. Due to
the randomness involved in the card deals, we compute the average payoffs using 100 simulations
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per pair of policy match-ups for players 1 and 2. This yields an asymmetric payoff matrix (due to
sequential-move nature of the game), which we then symmetrise to conduct our subsequent analysis.
E.10 Parity Game of Skill
Let us define a simple n-step game (per player), that has game of skill geometry. It is a two-player,
fully-observable, turn based game that lasts at most n-steps. Game state is a single bit s with initial
value 0. At each step, player can choose to: 1) flip the bit (a1); 2) guess that bit is equal to 0 (a2);
3) guess the bit is equal to 1 (a3); 4) keep the bit as it is (a4). At (per player) step n the only legal
actions are 2) and 3). If any of these two actions is taken, game ends, and a player wins iff it guessed
correctly. Since the game is fully observable, there is no real “guessing” here, agents know exactly
what is the state, but we use this construction to be able to study the underlying geometry in the
easiest way possible. First, we note that this game is n− 1-bit communicative, as at each turn agents
can transmit log2(|{a1, a3}|) = 1 bits of information, and game lasts for n steps, and the last one
cannot be used to transfer information. According to Theorem 1 this means that every antisymmetric
payoff of size 2n−1×n−1 can be realised. Figure 7 shows that this game with n = 3 has hundreds of
cycles, and Nash clusters of size 40, strongly exceeding lower bounds from Theorem 1. Since there
are just 161 pure strategies, we do not have to rely on sampling, and we can clearly see Spinning Top
like shape in the game profile.
F Other games that are not Games of Skill
Table 3 shows a few Noisy Elo Games, which cause Nashes to grow significantly over the transitive
dimension. We also run analysis on Kuhn-Poker, with 64 pure policies, which seems to exhibit
analogous geometry to Blotto game. Finally, there is also pure Rock Paper Scissor example, with
everything degenerating to a single point.
G Empirical Game Strategy Sampling
We use OpenSpiel [16] implementations of AlphaBeta and MCTS players as base of our experiments.
We expand AlphaBeta player to MinMax(d, s), which runs AlphaBeta algorithm up till depth d,
and if it did not succeed (game is deeper than d) then it executes random action using seed s instead.
We also define MaxMin(d, s) which acts in exactly same way, but uses flipped payoff (so seeks to
lose). We also include MinMax’(d, s) and MinMax(d, s) which act in the same way as before,
but if some branches of the game tree are longer than d, then they are assumed to have value of 0 (in
other words these use the value function that is contantly equal to 0). Finally we define MCTS(k, s)
which runs k simulations, and randomness is controlled by seed s. With these 3 types of players, we
create a set of agents to evaluate of form:
• MinMax(d,s) for each combination of
d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, s ∈ {1, . . . , 50}
• MinMax’(d,s) for each combination of
d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, s ∈ {1, . . . , 50}
• MaxMin(d,s) for each combination of
d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, s ∈ {1, . . . , 50}
• MaxMin’(d,s) for each combination of
d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, s ∈ {1, . . . , 50}
• MCTS(k,s) for each combination of
k ∈ {10, 100, 1000}, s ∈ {1, . . . , 50}
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Table 3: Top row, from left: Noisy Elo games with  = 0.1, 0.5, 1.0 respectively. Middle row,
from left: Blotto with N,K equal 5, 3; 5, 5, 10, 3 and 10, 5 respectively. Bottom row, from left:
Kuhn-Poker and Rock Paper Scissors.
This gives us 2000 pure strategies, that span the transitive axis. Addition of MCTS is motivated by
the fact that many of our games are too hard for AlphaBeta with depth 9 to yield strong policies. Also
MinMax(0,s) is equivalent to a completely random policy with a seed s, and thus acts as a sort of a
baseline for randomly initialised neural networks. Each of players constructed this way codes a pure
strategy (as thanks to seeding that act in a deterministic way).
H Empirical Game Payoff computation
For each game and pair of corresponding pure strategies, we play 2 matches, swapping which
player goes first. We report payoff which is the average of these two situations, thus effectively we
symmetrise games, which are not purely symmetric (due to their turn based nature). After this step,
we check if there are any duplicate rows, meaning that two strategies have exactly the same payoff
against every other strategy. We remove them from the game, treating this as a side effect of strategy
sampling, which does not guarantee uniqueness (e.g. if the game has less than 2000 pure strategies,
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than naturally we need to sample some multiple times). Consequently each empirical game has a
payoff not bigger than 2000× 2000, and on average they are closer to 1000× 1000.
I Fitting spinning top profile
For each plot relating mean RPP to size of Nash clusters, we construct a dataset
X := {(xi, yi)}ki=1 =

 1
k
k∑
j=1
RPP(Ci,Cj), |Ci|

k
i=1
.
Next, we use Skewed Normal pdf as a parametric model:
ψ(x|µ, σ, α) = σ2[2φ((x− µ)/σ2)Φ(α(x− µ)/σ2)],
where φ is a pdf of a standard Gaussian, and Φ its cdf. We further compose this model with simple
affine transformation since our targets are not normalised and not guaranteed to equal to 0 in infinities:
ψ′(x|µ, σ, α, a, b) = aψ(x|µ, σ, α) + b, ·
and find parameters µ, σ, α, a, b minimising
`(µ, σ, α, a, b) =
k∑
i=1
‖ψ′(xi|µ, σ, α, a, b)− yi‖2.
In general, using probability of data under the MLE skewed normal distribution model could be used
as a measure of “game of skillness”, but its applications and analysis is left for future research.
J Counting pure strategies
For a given 2 player turn-based game we can compute number of behaviourally different pure
strategies by traversing the game tree, and again using a recursive argument. Using notation from
previous sections, and zj to denote number of pure strategies for player j we put, for each state s
such that p(s) = j:
zj(s) =
{
1 , if terminal(s)∑
s′∈c(s)
[∏
s′′∈c(s′) zj(s
′′)
]
, otherwise
where the second equation comes from the fact, that two pure strategies are behaviourally different if
there exists a state, that both reach when facing some opponent, and they take different action there.
So to count pure strategies, we simply sum over all our actions, but need to take product of opponent
actions that follow, as our strategy needs to be defined in each of possible opponent moves, and each
such we multiply in how many ways we can follow from there, completing the recursion. If we now
ask our strategies to be able to play as both players (since in turn-based games are asymmetric) we
simply report z1(s0) · z−1(s0), since each combination of behaviour as first and second player is a
different pure strategy.
For Tic-Tac-Toe z1(s0) ≈ 10124 and z−1(s0) ≈ 10443 so in total we have approximately 10567 pure
strategies that are behaviourally different. Note, that behavioural difference does not imply difference
in terms of payoff, however difference in payoff implies behavioural difference. Consequently this is
an upper bound on number of size of the minimal payoff describing Tic-Tac-Toe as a normal form
game.
K Deterministic strategies and neural network based agents
Even though neural network based agents are technically often mixed strategies in the game theory
sense (as they involve stochasticity coming either from Monte Carlo Tree Search, or at least from the
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use of softmax based parametrisation of the policy), in practise they were found to become almost
purely deterministic as training progresses [19], so modelling them as pure strategies has empirical
justification. However, study and extension of presented results to the mixed strategies regime is an
important future research direction.
L Random Games of Skill
We show that random games also exhibit a spinning top geometry and provide a possible model for
Games of Skill, which admits more detailed theoretical analysis.
Definition 4 Random Game of Skill. We define a payoff of a Random Game of Skill as a random
antisymmetric matrix, where each entry equals:
f(pii, pij) :=
1
2 (Qij −Qji) = 12 (Wij −Wji) + Si − Sj
where Qij = Wij + Si − Sj , and Wij , Si are iid of N (0, σ2W ) and N (0, σ2S) respectively, where
σ = max{σW , σS}.
The intuition behind this construction is that Si will capture part of the transitive strength of a
strategy pii. If all the Wij components were removed then the game would be fully monotonic. It
can be seen as a linear version of a common Elo model [8], where each player is assigned a single
ranking, which is used to estimate winning probabilities. On the other hand, Wij is responsible for
encoding all interactions that are specific only to pii playing against pij , and thus can represent various
non-transitive interactions (i.e. cycles) but due to randomness, can also sometimes become transitive.
Let us first show that the above construction indeed yields a Game of Skill, by taking an instance of
this game of size n× n.
Proposition 4. If maxi,j |Wij | < α2 then the difference between maximal and minimal Si in each
Nash cluster Ca is bounded by α:
∀a max
pii∈Ca
Si − min
pij∈Ca
Sj ≤ α.
Proof. Let us hypothesise otherwise, so we have a Nash with strategy pia and pib such that Sa−Sb > α.
Let us show that pia has to achieve better outcome against each strategy pic than pib
f(pia, pic)− f(pib, pic)
= 12 (Wac −Wca −Wbc +Wcb) + (Sa − Sb)
> 12 (Wac −Wca −Wbc +Wcb) + α
≥ 0
(4)
consequently pib cannot be part of the Nash, contradiction.
Furthermore Nashes supports will be highest around 0 transitive strength, where most of the probabil-
ity mass of Si distribution is centred, and go towards 0 as they go to ±∞.
First, let us note that as the ratio of σS to σW grows, this implies that the number of Nash clusters
grows as each of them has upper bounded difference in Si by α that depends on magnitude of σW ,
while high value of σS guarantees that there are strategies pii with big differences in corresponding
Si’s. This constitutes of the transitive component of the random game. To see that the clusters sizes
are concentrated around zero, lets note that because of the zero-mean assumption of Si, this is where
majority of Si’s are sampled from. As a result, there is a higher chance of Wij forming cycles there,
then it is in less densely populated regions of Si scale. With these two properties in place . Figure 8
further visualises this geometry. This shape can also be seen by considering the limiting distribution
of mean strengths.
Proposition 5. As the game size grows, for any given k ∈ [n] the average payoff 1n
∑n
i=1 f(pik, pii)
behaves like N (Sk, 2σ2n ).
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Proof.
1
n
n∑
j=1
f(pik, pij) = Sk +
1
n
n∑
j=1
Wkj − 1n
n∑
j=1
Sj .
Using the central limit theorem and the fact that E[Wij ] = E[Sj ] = 0 , 1 ≤ j ≤ n and that these
variables have a variance bounded by σ2.
Now, let us focus our attention on training in such a game, given access to a uniform improvement
oracle, which given a set of m opponents returns a uniformly selected strategy from strategy space,
among the ones that beat all of the opponents, we will show probability of improving average
transitive strength of our population at time t, denoted as S¯t.
Theorem 4. Given a uniform improvement oracle we have that, S¯t+1 > S¯t −W, where W is a
random variable of zero mean and variance σ
2
m4 . Moreover, we have E[S¯t+1] > E[S¯t].
Proof. Uniform improvement oracle, given a set of index of strategies It ⊂ [n] (the current members
of our population) returns an index it such that,
∀i∈Itf(piit , pii) > 0 i.e. piit beats any pii , i ∈ It
and creates It+1 that consists in replacing a randomly picked i ∈ It by it. If the oracle cannot return
such index then the training process stops. What we care about is the average skill of the population
described by It, S¯t := 1m
∑
i∈It Si, where m := |It|. By the definition of a uniform improvement
oracle we have,
∀i∈Itf(piit , pii) > 0 (5)
Thus, if we call a := it and b is the index of the replaced strategy we get
1
m
∑
i∈It+1
Si =
1
m
∑
i∈It
Si +
1
m
(Sa − Sb) (6)
= 1m
∑
i∈It
Si +
1
m
(Qab − W˜ab) (7)
> 1m
∑
i∈It
Si − 1
m
W˜ab. (8)
where W˜ij := 12 (Wij −Wji). This concludes the first part of the theorem. For the second part we
notice that since the strategy in It is replaced uniformly and W˜ij , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n are independent of
variance bounded by σ2, we have,
Var
[
1
mWaj
]
= 1m2E
 1
m
∑
j∈It
Waj
 = σ2m4 (9)
Finally taking the expectation conditioned on It, we get
E
 1
m
∑
i∈It+1
Si|It
 > 1m∑
i∈It
Si. (10)
The theorem shows that the size of the population, against which we are training, has a strong effect
on the probability of transitive improvement, as it reduces the variance of W at a quartic rate. This
result concludes our analysis of random Games of Skill, we now follow with empirical confirmation
of both the geometry and properties predicted made above.
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Figure 5: Partial execution of the n-communicativeness algorithm for Tic-Tac-Toe. Black nodes
represent states that no longer can reach all possible outcomes. Green ones last states before all
the children nodes would be either terminating or are coloured black. The selected children states
(building subset A) are encoded in green (for crosses) and blue (for circles), with the edge captioned
with number of bits transmitted (logarithm of number of possible children), minimum number of bits
one can transmit afterwards, and minimum number of bits for the other player (because it is a turn
based game). n at each node is minimum of φx and φo, while for a player p making a move in state s,
we have φp = maxA⊂c(s){log2 |A|+ mins′∈A minp′ φp′(s′)}. Red states are the one not selected in
the parent node by maximisation over subsets.
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Figure 6: Visualisation of construction from Proposition 1. Left) split of the 19 x 19 Go board into
regions where black stones (red), and white stones (blue) will play. Each player has 180 possible
moves. Centre) Exemplary first 7 moves, intuitively, ordering of stones encodes a permutation
over 180, which corresponds to
∑180
i=1 log2(i) = log2(
∏180
i=1 i) = log2(180!) ≈ 1000 bits being
transmitted. Right) After exactly 360 moves, board will always look like this, at which point
depending on Pid(black),id(white) black player will resign (if it is supposed to lose), or play the centre
stone (if it is supposed to win).
Figure 7: Game profile of Parity Game of Skill with 3 steps. Note that its Nash clusters are of size 40,
and number of cycles exceeds 140, despite being only 2-bit communicative.
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Figure 8: Game profile of the random Game of Skill. Upper left: payoff matrix; Upper right: relation
between fraction of strategies beaten for each strategy and number of RPS cycles it belongs to (colour
shows which Nash cluster this strategy belongs to); Lower left: payoff between Nash clusters in
terms of RPP [2]; Lower right: relation between fraction of clusters beaten wrt. RPP and the size of
each Nash cluster. Payoffs are sorted for easier visual inspection.
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